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    Fundamental Uncertainty, Portfolio Choice,








One of Keynes’ core issues in his liquidity preference theory is how fundamen-
tal uncertainty aﬀects the propensity to hold money as a liquid asset. The paper
critically assesses various formal representations of fundamental uncertainty and
provides an argument for a more boundedly rational approach to portfolio choice
between liquidity and risky assets. The choice is made on the basis of individ-
ual beliefs which are subject to mental representations of the underlying economic
structure. Self-consciousness arises when the agent is aware of the fact that beliefs
are dispersed among agents due to the absence of a “true” model. Responding to
this fact by increasing liquidity preference is rationalized by the higher ex post per-
formance of choice. Moreover, we analyze the case that the portfolio is partially
ﬁnanced by debt. It is explored how fundamental uncertainty aﬀects the volume of
the portfolio and hence money and credit demand as well as the probability of debt
failures.
Keywords: liquidity preference, portfolio choice, self-conﬁdence, self-consciousness,
fundamental uncertainty, bounded rationality, Keynes, Knight.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G11, D81, E41, B31
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According to Keynes (1936) uncertainty plays a crucial role for holding liquidity, es-
pecially money. Uncertainty is understood not as risk which could be presented as a
singleton probability measure on the set of events, but as fundamental uncertainty about
the underlying structures, economic relationships, the inferences that could be drawn
from past experience, etc. Such fundamental uncertainty arises due to the uniqueness
of an event, the novelty of an economic activity or technology as well as to the lack of
knowledge about the underlying economic causal relationships or the fact that knowledge
is inconclusive for probabilistic inferences. Some investment decisions are unique in the
sense that they are not repetitive and have no long record of experience regarding the
distribution of returns. Most investment decisions incorporate a speciﬁc “new” element so
that accumulated knowledge is of limited use to form expectations about future outcomes.
The agent has simply no objective basis to determine reasonable probability measures.
In a similar fashion also Knight (1921) called for fundamental uncertainty in the sense
that the agent doubts his own probability measures since they are based on vague and
subjective knowledge. It is widely discussed that this fundamental uncertainty as opposed
to risk and also to ambiguity requires a new route in the theory of decision making (for
example Dequech (2000a), Dequech (2000b), de Carvalho (1988), Fontana and Gerrard
(2004), Rosser (2001), Wray (2006)).
Some economists claim that fundamental uncertainty is an omnipresent and unavoidable
phenomenon since the economic process evolves in historical time, the unknown underlying
economic structures may change over time and produce therefore a non-ergodic trajec-
tory of data (Davidson (1987), de Carvalho (1988)). This would exclude any Bayesian
rationality. It should be noted, however, that non-ergodicity is not proven to be an over-
all empirically relevant phenomenon and that it should not be invoked as a “nihilistic”
argument against any form of expectation formation (Rosser (2001)). Also Keynes’ main
point was to think about how a rational agent behaves in presence of uncertainty, not to
disprove any rationality. But the point is not (only) the question of non-ergodicity. It is
typical that among economic agents as well as among economists there exist diﬀerent and
partially conﬂicting views about reality, and the existing empirical data does not clearly
rule out most of them and does not give a clear evidence for only one point of view.
Thus, beliefs are dispersed which reﬂects fundamental uncertainty, and it is a matter of
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While Knight emphasizes the lack of self-conﬁdence in own probability measures, which
is more close to the problem of ambiguity, Keynes points out the uncertainty about in-
ferences in case of inconcludent or missing knowledge (see Hoogduin (1987) for a detailed
discussion). Or in other words: it is the uncertainty regarding the weight of empirical
evidence for probability judgements versus the uncertainty regarding the weight of an
argument or conclusion. The Keynesian view is a broader perspective which also includes
self-consciousness about the own expectations. The latter could also be related to econo-
metric estimation risk where the “true model” is known but its parameters are estimated
from data in an unbiased way. As we will discuss later, this would open ways to deal with
estimation risk in a proper econometric way. Keynesian fundamental uncertainty with
absence of a ﬁcticious “true” model is more diﬃcult to deal with.
In Keynes’ view holding liquidity is a kind of hedging instrument against fundamental
uncertainty. The interest rate indicates the marginal willingness to waive for this kind of
hedging. In the presence of fundamental uncertainty the existence of money (as well as
the possibility to create money via credit) and the liquidity preference have an important
impact e.g. on investment behavior which results in non-neutrality of money (Runde
(1994), Davidson (1988)).
Understanding fundamental uncertainty and holding liquidity as a response to it is there-
fore an important and broadly discussed issue from a micro- as well as from a macro-
perspective which deserves a closer look from a bounded rationality perspective. We will
ﬁrst brieﬂy review diﬀerent ways how fundamental uncertainty is incorporated into de-
cision theory and put forward an argument why a boundedly rational approach is more
appropriate to explain behavior (chapter 2). In chapter 3 we provide a simple model
how an agent allocates his ﬁnancial ressources to risky asets and riskless liquidity. It is
shown how this portfolio choice is aﬀected by fundamental uncertainty and the degree of
self-conﬁdence or self-consciousness. The rationale for adopting heuristic modiﬁcations of
the portfolio approach is that it provides a higher ex post performance than naive rational
decision making. In chapter 4 we analyse the case that the portfolio is partially ﬁnanced
by debt. We show how (the response to) fundamental uncertainty aﬀects the debt size
and the probability of debt failures. Chapter 5 concludes.
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nesian Uncertainty
At a ﬁrst sight it is hard or even impossible to integrate fundamental uncertainty into the
logic of rational economic decision making. It is especially incommensurable with expected
utility theory. Expected utility theory (EUT), however, has been challenged by a large
and even growing body of robust empirical evidence which contradicts the predictions of
EUT (Camerer (1995)). As a response, diﬀerent types of non-expected utility theories
have been developped where some of them also capture ambiguity and uncertainty (Gilboa
(1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Camerer and Weber (1992), Chateauneuf (1991),
or recently Hill (2009)). These approaches represent fundamental uncertainty e.g. by
non-additive probability measures or multiple priors, and they represent the response
of the decision maker to uncertainty in terms of preferences, e.g. ambiguity aversion.
Almost all approaches are probabilistic in that uncertainty is represented as ambiguity:
Subjective probability measures may be unreliable and the decision maker has not perfect
conﬁdence in his measures or he assigns diﬀerent probability measures a diﬀerent degree
of (im)plausibility. In addition to these representations the theory has also consider the
attitude to ambiguity (Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), Ghirardato et al. (2004)). These
approaches usually have an axiomatic foundation, and many economists accept them as a
reasonable answer to the problem of Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty (see Basili and
Zappia (2009), Fontana and Gerrard (2004), or Dequech (2000b) for a critical discussion).
One of the most prominent concepts is the multiple prior approach. While the sub-
jective risk is expressed as a singleton probability measure, fundamental uncertainty is
represented by a set of diﬀerent priors which also may be taken into consideration as an
appropriate description of the situation. The agent is therefore uncertain about the ex-
pected utility, so that we need further (ambiguity) preferences to describe how the agent
responds to this kind of uncertainty, i.e. to the set of diﬀerent priors. A reasonable as-
sumption is that the decision should be in some sense robust against belief errors. One
example is maxmin behavior where the alternative with highest expected utility under the
most pessimistic prior is chosen. Another approach is to relax the axiomatic foundations
to allow for non-additive measures. Fundamental uncertainty could then be interpreted
as decision weights or distortions of probabilities. The non-additivity allows for a consis-
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and Zappia (2009)). These concepts has been widely used to create new insights into
investment behavior (Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)), the dynamic allocation of income to
consumption and savings (Miao (2003)), or the behavior of agents on ﬁnancial markets
(Epstein and Wang (1994), overview in Basili (2001)), especially in portfolio decisions
(Orszag and Yang (1995), Ma et al. (2008)).
A similar, but complete non-probabilistic approach is the Fuzzy Set theory (Zimmermann
(1996)). Fundamental uncertainty is represented as vague or fuzzy knowledge about
possible states of the world. The “degree of possibility” of a state or a parametrization of
a model is captured by a membership function which assigns a certain “weight” to each
state. The main advantage is that strong requirements of a probabilistic theory such as
the existence of a σ-algebra of the set of states are not neccessary. Also this approach has
been used to characterize agent’s behavior under fundamental uncertainty (e.g. Arnold
et al. (2000), Cherubini (1997)).
One key element of uncertainty is that agents do not know the “true” model which gen-
erates the economic data. Moreover, it is not possible by principle to know the “true”
model. This is in opposition to rational expectations where we have common knowledge
about the underlying structure where all parameters are known or could be learned in a
consistent way. From an epistomological point of view things are even worse: A “true
model” is an oxymoron since a model is per se an abstraction, an explanatory device
which is constructed by an observer, communicated between observers, and – in the best
case – does not contradict the observed data. Whether a model is “true” is an undecis-
able question as a matter of principle, hence rational decisions must be made without
reference to “truth”. This epistomological banality is a point for Keynesian fundamental
uncertainty: knowledge is about data, but the causal relationships which produce the
data are subject to diﬀerent and eventually conﬂicting hypothesis. Or as Loasby (2003)
notes: “Knowledge is an open system of selected relationships and the adequacy of our
representations of phenomena are always subject to Knightian uncertainty” (p.285). The
best possible case is negative knowledge about false hypothesis which contradict empirical
observations. Thus, the data might give some evidence, or “weight” in Keynesian terms,
to propositions about the underlying structure. But rational decisions have to be done in
absence of “truth”.
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representation of the world, should in the mean be conformed by observed data. To be
more speciﬁc: Subjective ex ante beliefs are dispersed but should not systematically
deviate in the mean from ex post realizations. Even in the case of rational expectations
(RE) with its very strong and questionable common knowledge assumptions it is possible
that a wide range of diﬀerent models may be observationally equivalent (Beyer and Farmer
(2003), Beyer and Farmer (2008)). Therefore, even in the RE paradigm we have an
argument for the non-existence of the “true” model. Agents trust in their model not
because it is regarded to be the “truth” but because it provides some consistency. But
if there is a multiplicity of observationally equivalent models why should agents trust in
their exclusive explanatory power? Why should an agent believe that other agents adopt
the same view? Therefore, in the following we specify fundamental uncertainty with an
irreducible dispersion of beliefs or diversity of opinions. Of course these dispersed beliefs
result in dispersed expectations and decisions.
Our assumption that beliefs, formed on subjective representations of the world, should
be compatible with the observed data is related to the theory of rational beliefs (Kurz
(1994b)). An equilibrium in rational beliefs (see Kurz (1994a)) is then a state where all
agents act according to their beliefs, and the beliefs are consistent with the data which
are driven by the individual decisions. There is no need for the knowledge (and even
the concept) of a “true” description of the world to derive choice behavior consistently.
On the aggregated level the dispersion of diﬀerent rational beliefs has a similar eﬀect as
the multiple priors on the individual level. It can be shown that in such rational belief
equilibria money is non-neutral (Motolese (2001)).
All brieﬂy discussed ways to represent fundamental uncertainty – multiple priors, non-
additive measures, fuzzy set representations – require heavy additional assumptions about
non-observable entities, e.g. multiple priors, preferences about how to deal with ambigu-
ity, membership functions and defuzziﬁcation strategies in the fuzzy set approach, etc..
These entities constitute the core of the explanans for understanding observable decision
making. The argument put forward in Pasche (2008) is that a theory loses explanatory
power when imposing a rich and speciﬁc structure for non-observable antecedence con-
ditions. For almost all kind of behavior under fundamental uncertainty it is possible to
construct sets of priors, ambiguity preferences, decision weights, distortions of probability
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behavioral evidence. In what sense the behavior is “explained” if most of explanatory
variables are non-observable and subject to arbitrary assumptions about them? If the
resulting equilibria are ambigous so that the real evolution is driven by invoking “an-
imal spirits” (like in Epstein and Wang (1994)), the question arises why the reader is
confronted with complex mathematical representations when in the end such vague be-
havioral concepts are neccessary to drive the results. Much simpler hypothesis about
boundedly rational decision making seem to be more appropriate. In the Keynes exe-
gesis it is a discussed question whether any kind of Bayesian rationality is in line with
Keynesian ideas or whether behavioral approaches are a more appropriate framework to
represent them (Leijonhufvud (1993), Rosser (2001)).
We identify “behavioral approaches” with heuristic or rule-governed behavior (Vanberg
(1994), Vanberg (2004)). This is opposed to the broadly accepted but nevertheless mis-
leading use of the term “behavioral” in economic theories where the rationality concept –
deriving decisions from axioms on preferences – is still intact but preferences are enriched
by intrinsic motives, social attitudes or, like in our case, by measures of fundamental
uncertainty and attitudes to them. Rule-governed behavior, instead, means that decision
behavior is not derived from a closed calculus. Agents are assumed to follow their mate-
rial preferences only indirectly within an adopted set of behavioral patterns. These may
include simple rules of thumb as well as commitments to social norms, and also more or
less sophisticated procedures. The lack of explanatory power of invoking rich structured
sets of non-observable variables has been critizized before. However, the same criticism
holds true in case of behavioral hypothesis. If we are decoupling (material) preferences
and decision behavior by assuming rule-guided behavior we are also free do assume any
behavioral heuristic that ﬁts observed data. This alleged loss of internal consistency
provoces scepticism about the explanatory power of behavioral economics (Pesendorfer
(2006), Gul and Pesendorfer (2005)). But we argue that behavioral rules have to be jus-
tiﬁed in that their adoption leads to equilibrium outcomes which are superior in terms of
the agent’s material preferences. So we are not free to assume any behavioral rules but
only those which represent an equilibrium in the sense that a single agent cannot beneﬁt
from adopting another rule (for details see Pasche (2008)).
As Aumann (2008) argues, rationality can be interpreted as rule rationality rather than
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explanatory power since the logic why some rules are adopted and others not follows
traditional economic reasoning. In contrast, a similar rationale is not as easy possible to
justify assumptions about ambiguity preferences, decision weights, or distortions of proba-
bility measures. If behavior is consistent with complex preferences involving non-material
motives and attitudes, then the outcome of behavior should be evaluated with these pref-
erences. It is then questionable whether the welfare of an equilibrium outcome should
be assessed in material terms. An observable poor payoﬀ or a loss of material welfare
may possibly be beneﬁcial in terms of complex preferences including biased probability
measures, speciﬁc subjective beliefs on the plausibility of inferences, ambiguity prefer-
ence parameters etc.. This problem does not arise in the proposed behavioral approach
where behavioral performance is simply measured in terms of material preferences. In
the following chapter we adopt this view of rule rationality as we justify slight heuristic
deviations from rational portfolio decisions – as an expression of self-consciousness in case
of fundamental uncertainty – by their superior performance ex post.
3 Portfolio choice and fundamental uncertainty
3.1 The dispersion of beliefs
A portfolio P consists of a risky part R and a risk-free asset which is considered to be
money. The share of wealth which is hold as money indicates the liquidity preference
of the agent. The risky portfolio R consists of diﬀerent risky assets i with subjectively
expected returns µi, variances σ2
i and covariances σ2
ij. Standard portfolio theory assumes
that these values are “given” or “known” by the individual. In an uncertain world these
values have to be estimated in some way on the basis of observed data and considerations
about the underlying data generating process. Obtaining the parameters is not only
a demanding data retrieving and information processing task. But moreover, there is
fundamental uncertainty regarding the underlying structural relations and processes and
their stability over time. Therefore, the ex post parameter values of the distribution
cannot be “known” ex ante by principle. We will assume that the returns of the risky
assets are generated by a distribution which could be described by ¯ µi, ¯ σ2
i, ¯ σ2
ij for all i,j.
These values should not be considered as “true” values since they are not generated by
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uncertainty. They incorporate the individual responses to fundamental uncertainty like
self-conﬁdence or self-consciousness.
We consider individual beliefs as “rational” in the sense that they are in the mean con-
sistent with the ex post realized data:
µi = ¯ µi + ²1,i, σ
2
i = ¯ σ
2
i + ²2,i, σ
2
ij = ¯ σ
2
ij + ²ij ∀i,j
where all ² have a zero mean. The variances V ar[²] (we suppress speciﬁc indices for ²)
and covariances are a measure for the dispersion of beliefs. The individual is assumed to
be aware of the fact that beliefs are dispersed. This means that the agent knows that
there exists other considerations about the undelying process than his own, and that his
beliefs will diﬀer from the ex post realizations with the same probability than the beliefs
of any other agent. This reﬂects uncertainty, since he has no objective basis to assume
that his beliefs are closer to the ex post realized values than the beliefs of others.
One could object that under these assumptions it is possible to generate a statistic on all
beliefs, to average them and to replace the original beliefs with the averaged one. This is,
however, a misleading idea for three reasons: (a) An “averaged belief” is inconsistent with
the individual considerations about the underlying process, i.e. with the mental model
of the economy. (b) The empirically determined “average belief” is only an estimator of
¯ µi, ¯ σ2
i, ¯ σ2
ij. This estimator itself is dispersed around the average values. (c) If decisions
are made upon these “averaged beliefs” the nature of the generating process may change
and the ex ante averaged values may not be conﬁrmed by the ex post realizations. We
will henceforth assume that decisions are made upon µi,σ2
i,σ2
ij. Agents may respond to
fundamental uncertainty but they can not “correct” their beliefs ex ante.
For low V ar[²], the ex ante beliefs are similar which indicates that the underlying mental
models of the world may not be too diﬀerent. In the extreme case of V ar[²] → 0 all
agents have identical expectations, based on identical or equivalent beliefs regarding the
underlying structure. Since the subjectively expected values are then equal to the ex
post realized values, the beliefs about the economic model must be “true”, and the model
collapses to a rational expectations approach.
We have to distinguish between the matter of fact that individual beliefs are fundamentally
uncertain and dispersed around a mean, and the awareness of the individual that his
9
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not respond to uncertainty. He will make naive rational decisions based on µi,σ2
i,σ2
ij.
We call such an agent self-conﬁdent. An agent who feels uncertain and responds to this
uncertainty in some way is called self-conscious. For the reasons discussed in chapter 2,
we will describe this self-consciousness not by a Bayesian multiple-prior framework, but
with boundedly rational heuristics.
The outlined description of uncertain beliefs is very similar to the well investigated case
of estimation risk. If we interpret ¯ µi, ¯ σ2
i, ¯ σ2
ij as the “true” parameters of the underlying
process, and µi,σ2
i,σ2
ij as unbiased estimators, then these estimators are also dispersed
around the mean, and their variance depend on the sample size (among other things).
It is well understood that conventional estimation risk leads to biased portfolio decisions
and loss of performance (Siegel and Woodgate (2005), Michaud (1998), Barberis (2000),
Chopra and Ziemba (1993), Kan and Zhou (2005)). In general, this problem cannot
be avoided completely, but it could be alleviated by diﬀerent adjustment procedures.
The core idea of these procedures is that both, the estimation of values from data and
the portfolio decisions made upon these estimations, should be determined in one op-
timization approach instead of two sequential steps. This leads to diﬀerent (adjusted)
estimators the usual portfolio approach is applied to (e.g. Fomby and Samanta (1991),
Jorion (1991)). The portfolio performance will be increased because the estimators are
not unbiased anymore. Compared to Bayesian approaches which have a similar logic
than the multiple prior approaches as discussed in chapter 2, Siegel and Woodgate (2005)
prove that certain non-Bayesian procedures may have just a slightly higher performance
than Bayesian ones. Furthermore, they show that such procedures are also supported by
empirical evidence. While the authors prove the asymptotic characteristics of the adjust-
ment procedures, it is clear that there exists an open class of adjustment procedures how
to deal with estimation risk which lead to performance improvements.
It has to be noted that estimation risk is diﬀerent from fundamental uncertainty even
if it has similar implications. To go a step further one can assume model uncertainty
in addition to estimation risk. Tu and Zhou (2004) show that this kind of uncertainty
also has a biasing eﬀect on portfolio choice. It has to be noted, however, that all these
studies start from a given “true” process and an ideal portfolio which is based on the exact
knowledge of the parameter of this process. Performance losses or gains from adjusting
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 085procedures are calculated by comparison with the ideal situation. This is impossible when
the “true” model is unknown as a matter of principle. But it is always possible to consider
a portfolio which is ex post optimal and serves as a benchmark.
3.2 Portfolio decisions and response to uncertainty
First, we analyze the portfolio decision based on the subjective beliefs without being aware
of fundamental uncertainty (case of complete self-conﬁdence). The agent will calculate
the set of eﬃcient portfolios and determines the optimal risky portfolio R which should
be combined with riskless liquidity. Since we are only interested in the share of money,
interpreted as the liquidity preference, we will neglect all biasing eﬀects on the composition
of the risky portfolio. To keep the analysis as simple as possible we assume that the
subjectively expected performance of R, described by µ,σ2 is in the mean identical with
the performance of the ex post optimal portfolio which is based on ¯ µi, ¯ σ2
i, ¯ σ2
ij:
µ = ¯ µ + ²1 (1)
σ
2 = ¯ σ
2 + ²2 (2)
with E[²1] = E[²2] = 0 and V1 = V ar[²1], V2 = V ar[²2], COV = Cov[²1,²2]. These
variances reﬂect the dispersion of the beliefs which are transformed into variances of the
expected performance. Again, the beliefs about the portfolio performance are “rational”
in the sense that they are ex post conﬁrmed in the mean.
This risky portfolio is now combined with riskless liquidity. We assume that holding
liquidity yields no return. Let λ be the share of ﬁnancial wealth V which is invested into
the risky portfolio R. The realized value of the portfolio after the investment period is
therefore ˜ V = V (1 + λr) with r as the realized return with E[r] = µ,V ar[r] = σ2. The
agent subjectively expects a mean wealth E[˜ V ] = V (1 + λµ) and a variance V ar[˜ V ] =
V 2λ2σ2.
Since we want to seperate the decisions about the portfolio structure (λ) and decisions
about the invested wealth V we have to choose a utility function which allows for a
separate maximization. It is well known that only utility functions with constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) have this property. The usual quadratic (µ,σ)-approach does not
meet this requirement. We adopt the Power function which is widely used in micro-
and macroeconomics: u(˜ V ) = ˜ V (1−θ)/(1 − θ) where θ > 0 is the constant Arrow-Pratt
11
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Given the beliefs and the behavior of all agents and therefore the ex post values ¯ µ, ¯ σ2
the optimal composition would be ¯ λ = ¯ µ/(θ¯ σ2). Since the individual expectations are
dispersed and σ2 is in the denominator of λ∗ the averaged decision is obvioulsy biased due
to the Jensen inequality. Developping E[λ∗] as a second order Taylor expansion around
¯ λ we have (details see appendix c)):
E[λ
∗] = ¯ λ +





It is reasonbale to assume the covariance COV is negative, i.e. if the expected return is
overestimated then it is more likely that the variance is underestimated (case of being
“too optimistic”) and vice versa (being “too pessimistic”). Alternatively, also COV = 0
may be regarded. Then the bias is always positive which implies that due to dispersion of
beliefs the ex ante determined fraction of the risky portfolio λ is too large. The ex post
experienced risk is larger than expected ex ante. This result is in line with the literature
(e.g. Muller (1993)).
As we have seen, the choice of λ∗ is not robust against uncertainty as reﬂected in dis-
persion of beliefs. The ex post performance of the portfolio cannot be optimal since the
“ideal” portfolio is characterized by ¯ λ. This creates beneﬁts of deviating from the stan-
dard portfolio choice. According to Pasche (1997) agents beneﬁt from choosing heuristic
deviations from rational choice since these decisions are more robust against “errors”.
Since it is impossible to derive an optimal adaption to uncertainty in a closed form – this
would require knowledge about ex post values ¯ µ, ¯ σ2 – these heuristic adaptions (rules)
should be referred to as boundedly rational.
In the present case a simple adaptive rule is
λ
a(β) = (1 − β)λ
∗, β ∈ [0,1)
With β = 0 the agent is completely self-conﬁdent or not aware of the fact that beliefs
are dispersed and decisions are biased. For β > 0 he tries to compensate the bias by
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the “optimal” debiasing rule, but this cannot be determined ex ante due to the lack of
knowledge of ¯ λ. But it can be argued that a single agent may learn β∗ at least in a
stationary environment. Since the ex post expected utility (performance) is a monotone
strictly concave function in λ with ¯ λ as a global maximum, it follows from the epigraphe
theorem that the set B of all β for which λa(β) leads to a higher portfolio performance




With β = 0 the agent starts from the border of this convex set and learns to adapt β e.g.
by reinforcement learning. Obviously, it is β∗ ∈ B. For the purpose of the paper we are
not interested in the learning dynamics. We conﬁne to the fact that this behavior reﬂects
increasing liquidity preference as a response to fundamental uncertainty.
If an agent responds to fundamental uncertainty by choosing β > 0 and hence deviating
from naive maximizing he shows a higher liquidity preference. It would be possible to
“rationalize” any λ 6= λ∗ by introducing additional unobservable structures like multiple
priors, decision weights, ambiguity aversion preferences. But the boundedly rational pol-
icy rule λa(β) points out that the agent compromises his own beliefs and the resulting
optimal decisions with the fact that other agents have other beliefs and draw other con-
clusions. Due to the fact that beliefs and opinions about the underlying structure are
dispersed and that there are no a priori reasons that his own point of view is “correct”
or “superior”, the agent will be self-conscious. Moreover, he knows that there is no way
to robustify his decision via a closed calculus that guarantees a priori a maximum perfor-
mance. But the agent is able to learn that it may be beneﬁcial to compromise subjective
optimality considerations with heuristic adaptations.
The higher the self-consciousness the higher the chosen β. The reason of becoming more
concerned with uncertainty may be psychological but could also be driven by an increas-
ing dispersion of beliefs, denoted by V1,V2,|COV |. This would negatively aﬀect the ex
post experienced performance and makes it beneﬁcial to adapt β. It should be noted,
however, that an adaption of β may be performance-improving only ceteris paribus, i.e.
the behavior of all other agents is unchanged. An unilateral adaption of behavior creates
beneﬁts for the individual. But if, in contrast, all agents adapt their β this would induce a
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ing the learning dynamics it is not possible to draw conclusion about the performance in
the equilibrium. But nevertheless it is clear that increasing (concern about) uncertainty
will lead to a change in liquidity preference.
4 A debt-ﬁnanced portfolio
4.1 Determining optimal debt size
Portfolio theory is about the optimal structure of the portfolio. Since we assumed a CRRA
utility function we are now able to analyse the decision about the invested ﬁnancial wealth
V (henceforth called portfolio volume). We assume that the invested volume could be
expanded by debt-ﬁnanced ﬁnancial funds. It is rational to expand the portfolio via debt
as long as the marginal utility of a portfolio unit exceeds the marginal cost of reﬁnancing
this unit, i.e. the interest rate to be paid for the debt.
Assume that the individual could invest own capital C and borrowed ﬁnancial ressources
D. The total portfolio volume is hence V = C + D. Let i be the ﬁxed interest rate to
be paid for the debt D. We assume that the utility from holding the portfolio and the
interest payments are separable. The utility function has to be extended by subtracting
















= ξ · (C + D)






1−θ = i (5)
It has to be noted, that in this case the utility function is cardinal. Otherwise the
marginal utility would be arbitrary since an ordinal function u is unique up to a positive
aﬃne transformation. Therefore we have added ξ > 0 in order to choose a proper scale for
marginal utility for obtaining realisitic values. Due to risk aversion the marginal utility is
decreasing in the portfolio volume, and the intersection point ∂E[u]/∂D = i determines
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The eﬀect of an increasing portfolio performance µ on D∗ is negative (positive) for θ > 1
(θ < 1) as it can seen by diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to µ. Increasing portfolio
performance leads to higher total expected utility, eventually accelerated by an increase
of λ, but this implies a lower marginal utility due to the concavity of u(·). Hence the
portfolio has to be sized down. Only in case of low risk aversion (θ < 1) the marginal








eﬀect of increasing µ
with θ > 1
with θ < 1
Figure 1: Eﬀect of increasing expected returns on debt size
We study the eﬀect of belief dispersion on the expected debt size, including the indirect
eﬀect on λ when θ > 1. In case of θ < 1 we have typically a strict boundary solution
λ∗ = 1 so that we will not observe additional variance from λ∗. We develop (7) as a
second degree Taylor expansion around the ex post optimal ¯ D which depends on ¯ µ, ¯ σ2
and apply the expectation operator (see appendix d)).
E[D
∗] = ¯ D + bias(D)
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less risk-averse or almost risk-neutral agents tend to oversize the debt volume, more risk-
averse agents underestimate the marginal utility of their portfolio and choose D below
the optimal level.
As we have discussed above, agents who are uncertain regarding their beliefs will be self-
conscious and adapt the portfolio structure in favor of liquidity. We assumed a simple
boundedly rational procedure λa = (1 − β)λ∗ for such an adaption. A lower λ decreases
the expected utility of the portfolio but enhances its marginal expected utility. Therefore,
an adaption of λ via β alleviates both, the bias(λ) as well as the bias(D). Only in case of
very low risk-aversion with a boundary solution λ∗ = 1 we assume that responding to the
uncertainty will not keep the agent away from the boundary. But it might be reasonable
to assume a separate heuristic to adapt the debt volume D in case of self-consciousness.
4.2 Probability of debt failures
Since the adapting procedure reduces the bias and thus leads to a higher ex post perfor-
mace of the portfolio it has also an eﬀect on the probability of debt failures. Diﬀerent cases
could be distinguished (see also ﬁgure 1 where F(r) denotes the cumulative probability
distribution of the returns):
• The current return of the portfolio may be not suﬃcient to cover the interest pay-
ments. In this case we have a negative return on the own capital C:
prob(λ
a(C + D









• The ex post value ˜ V is not suﬃcient to pay back debt including interest payments:
prob((C + D
∗)(1 − λ









Since λa and D∗ have a certain bias, also the expected values E[Z1],E[Z2] will be biased.
We are not interested in calculating these expected values. Obviously, Z1,Z2 depend
negatively on λ and positively on D. A self-conﬁdent agent has therefore c.p. a lower
probability for debt troubles than a self-conscious risk-averse agent who adapts to un-
certainty by increasing β. Inserting D∗ and λa into the expression Z1, it can easily seen
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V (1 − β2)µ2 + 2θσ2
which is positive for θ > 1 (analogously for Z2). Hence there is a trade-oﬀ between
the performance-enhancing eﬀect of increasing liquidity preference and the probability
of facing debt failures. This may induce a problematic self-enforcing eﬀect: Increasing
uncertainty leads to higher liquidity preference (increasing β), therefore the risk of debt
troubles increases. This enhances the uncertainty again, etc.
For a less risk-averse agent with θ < 1, however, the opposite holds true. If he does not
adapt λ because it is a boundary solution, also Z1,Z2 will not respond. If we assume also
for this type of agent an increasing β the values Z1,Z2 will decrease. This is explained by
the eﬀect that for low θ-values the expected debt size is too large in contrast to risk-averse
agents. A downwards adaption of λ would then help to reduce debt size.
If we assume that agents are typically characterized by θ > 1 we should expect that
with increasing self-consciousness they will adapt β and therefore reduce portfolio risk
and favor to hold money. Depending on the debt interest rate they will, however, also
slightly increase debt demand. Both eﬀects are complementary: Increasing debt demand
stimulates the endogenous creation of money which is accompanyied by the increased
preference for money as a part of the portfolio. In a phase of increasing self-conﬁdence
portfolios become more risky and will be more equity ﬁnanced. This result is in line with
models of banking behavior and with empirical evidence (see Krainer (2009)).
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We have argued that typical methods to account for Knightian or Keynesian uncertainty
in formal decision models have their merits, but lack explanatory power since large parts of
the explanans are related to non-observable variables. We favor a more boundedly rational
approach to deal with fundamental uncertainty. The paper provides a simple approach
how agents respond to fundamental uncertainty by using a simple adaptive rule which
modiﬁes portfolio choice. It shows that the structure as well as the debt-ﬁnanced volume
of the portfolio is aﬀected by the degree of self-conﬁdence/self-consciousness. Especially
the liquidity preference depends positively on the degree of fundamental uncertainty, as
Keynes had argued. The rationale for these adaptions is that the ex post experienced
performance of the portfolio will increase. This increasing desire to hold money is accom-
panyied by a larger debt demand and hence expansion of money supply. We have seen
that these performance enhancing eﬀects have negative eﬀects on the probability to get
in troubles of paying back the debt. We also ﬁnd diﬀerences in behavior between more
risk-averse and less risk-averse agents. It would be desirable to investigate the eﬀects
of becoming more self-conﬁdent in a population of more risk-averse and less risk-averse
agents e.g. in a boom phase. The model would propose that there would be a shift of
debt demand from the risk-averse to the less risk-averse agents, resulting in higher overall
risk and higher probability of debt failures. The results would be aﬀected by possible
correlations between the degree of risk-aversion and the degree of self-conﬁdence.
The aim of the approach is incorporate fundamental uncertainty into macro models. In
most macroeconomic models the ﬁnancial markets and especially the behavior of commer-
cial banks are far from having a rich and realistic structure. As discussed in Georg and
Pasche (2008) the behavior of a commercial bank as the hinge between central bank and
the ﬁnancial markets is driven by portfolio considerations. Incorporating fundamental
uncertainty into such a model would provide an explanation why in the current ﬁnancial
crisis banks are more self-conscious and restructure their portfolio in favor of more safe
and more liquid assets. Therefore a monetary policy impulse of lowering the reﬁnancing
costs will not neccessarily stimulate the debt supply.
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a) Optimal portfolio structure:
To separate decisions about portfolio structure and invested ﬁnancial wealth, we use the
Power function as a CRRA-utility function: u(˜ V ) = ˜ V (1−θ)/(1−θ) where θ is the Arrow-
Pratt measure for constant relative risk aversion. The uncertain value of the portfolio is
given by ˜ V = V + λV r where V is the invested ﬁnancial wealth, λ is the share which is
invested in the risky part of the portfolio (the secure part has zero interest rate for simplic-
ity), and r is the realized return which is normally distributed with E[r] = µ,V ar[r] = σ2.
It is not trivial to compute directly the expected utility E[u(˜ V )] so we calculate the risk
premium ψ and maximize the utility of the security equivalent:
max
λ∈[0,1]
u(V − ψ) = E[u(˜ V )]
Since E[λV r] = λV µ and V ar[λV r] = λ2V 2σ2 it is well known from literature that the















2 − λV µ
Inserting ψ into the utility function yields
u =










which is independend from the invested portfolio volume V .
b) Optimal debt size:
To obtain the marginal utility of the last portfolio unit we diﬀerentiate (8) with respect
to V . Since we can expand V = C + D only by debt (own capital C is ﬁxed), ﬁrst order
condition requires that the marginal utility must be equal to the interest rate i. Observe,
that in this case we have to interpret u as a cardinal utility function so we are free to
multiply marginal utility with ξ > 0 to obtain values on a reasonable scale. First order
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i = ξ

















Depending on θ we have to distinguish two cases: For relative large values of θ we have
interior solutions λ∗ ∈ (0,1). In this case we consider agents to choose λa = (1−β)λ∗. For
relative small values of θ we have the boundary solution λ∗ = 1. In this case we assume
that agents do not adapt their decisions since in most cases λa = argmax{(1 − β)λ∗,1}

































c) Bias of λ∗:
Since λ∗ depends nonlinearily on dispersed beliefs, the expected value E[λ∗] will diﬀer
from that ¯ λ which is optimal when the ex post values would have been known ex ante.
We call the diﬀerence bias(λ) = E[λ∗] − ¯ λ. For determining bias(λ) we compute the
expected value of a second degree Taylor expansion around ¯ λ. With E[²i] = 0 and
V [²i] = Vi,COV [²e,²2] = COV we have
E[λ
















= ¯ λ +




Since we have assumed COV ≤ 0 (see text) the bias is always positive.
c) Bias of D∗:
Also the optimal D∗ depends nonlinearily on dispersed beliefs so that we should expect
a deviation from the ex post optimal value ¯ D. Analogoulsy to appendix c) we call this
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i depends directly on µ,σ2 as well
as indirectly due to λa. In case of a boundary solution, D∗
b has no indirect eﬀects. For
both cases we calculate the bias as a second degree Taylor approximation of (7) around
¯ D (assuming COV = 0 for simplicity):
E[D










The derivatives on the r.h.s. are a little bit too elaborate to print them out here. Because
an interior solution requires a suﬃciently large θ we have θ > 1 as a condition that the
second order derivatives on the r.h.s. of (12) are negative. Hence the bias(D∗
i) is negative.
In case of a boundary solution the sign of the second order derivatives on the r.h.s. is
negative (positive) for θ > 0.5 (θ < 0.5). This implies that agents with very low or almost
no risk aversion will choose in the mean a debt level (far) above the level ¯ D which turned
out to be optimal ex post.
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